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THE TAFT-HAItTLEY ACT AND UNION POLITICAL
CONTRIBUTIONS AND EXPENDITURES
By JosEPH E. KALLENBACH*
A MONG the many features of the Labor-Management RelationE
(Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947 which have aroused resentment
within the ranks of organized labor the section which bars financial
contributions and expenditures by labor unions in connection with
federal elections stands high on the list. This provision in the
law represents the culmination of a ten-year campaign by cer-
tain elements in Congress to place labor unions under restraints
similar to those imposed upon business corporations with respect
to use of their funds for political objectives. The main justifi-
cation for such a limitation upon labor unions was asserted to be
the protection of the rights of those members who, entertaining
political views contrary to those of the majority, or at any rate,
of the leadership, found themselves nevertheless involuntarily con-
tributing through payment of dues and assessments to the pro-
motion of political programs to which they were actually opposed.
EMERGENCE OF THE PROBLEM
Political activity by labor unions on a scale sufficient to give
rise to a demand for regulative legislation dates from the 1936
presidential election. Prior to that time labor unions had on
occasion made direct money contributions to candidates and parties
in national elections or had made expenditures on behalf of candi-
dates they favored. The amounts involved were comparatively
small, however, and such contributions and expenditures did not
*Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan.
1. Public'Law 101, 80th Cong.; 1st Sess., sec. 304; 61 Stat. 159 (1947),
2 U. S. C. A., sec. 251 (1947 Supp.) ; 18 U. S. Code, sec. 610 (1948 rev.).
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-have significant influence on the final results. The report of
the Special Senatorial Committee to Investigate Campaign Expen-
ditures in the 1936 elections disclosed that labor unions contrib-
uted and loaned approximately $770,060 to the Democratic National
Committee and other political organizations supporting Dem-
ocratic candidates.3 Taking note of this new development, the
Special Committee, of which Senator Lonergan, of Connecticut,
was chairman, recommended legislation broadening the applica-
bility of a clause in the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925
which prohibited national banks and business corporations from
making contributions to political parties or candidates in national
elections, so as to include "all organizations, associations, or enter-
prises, incorporated or otherwise, whose aims or purposes are the
furtherance of group, class, or special interests."' 4 The Committee's
recommendation was thus an exceedingly sweeping one. Although
it obviously had relation to its findings regarding the part which
labor union funds had played in the 1936 election, it did not
mention labor organizations explicitly as the "associations" against
which the proposal was aimed. It would have extended the bar on
contributions to self-interested political pressure groups of all
kinds, whether composed of businessmen, professional people,
farmers, or unionized laborers.
This fact doubtless explains why there was no enthusiasm dis-
played immediately in Congress to act upon the Committee's
recommendation. The issue, so far as it concerned labor unions,
was first gingerly approached in a bill to amend the Wagner Labor
2. Cf. Overacker, "Labor's Political Contributions," 54 Pol. Sci. Q.
56-68 (March, 1939) ; also ch. III in Presidential Campaign Funds (1946) by
the same author, which is an excellent treatment of the general subject of
trade union funds in relation to political campaign finance. According to this
source the American Federation of Labor made expenditures for political
purposes totaling about $95.000 in the period from 1906 to 1925. The major
part of this sum was expended in the elecions of 1920 and 1924. Purposes for
which expenditures were made in this period covered mainly such items as
postage, leaflets, and expenses of speakers. Labor union sources contributed
some $7,500 to the LaFollette National Progressive Committee in 1924. and
other labor union funds were expended directly in LaFollette's behalf in
that year.
3. Sen. Rep. No. 151, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 127-133 (1937). According
to the Committee's report the chief labor union contributor was the United
Mine Workers of America, which contributed approximately $380,000 to
various political organizations favoring the Democratic party. Chief recipients
of these contributions were the Democratic National Committee and Labor's
Non-Partisan Political League. In addition this union made a loan of
$50,000 to the Democratic National Committee and one of $40,000 to the
Pennsylvania State Democratic Committee. Records of the Democratic Na-
tional Committee show that the loan to it was repaid in 1937 and 1938.
4. Id. at 135.
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Relations Act offered by Senator Vandenberg, of Michigan, in
1937. One section of the Vandenberg proposal would have declared
it to be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to "make
any compulsory assessment, or require any contribution, for political
purposes."' The bill was not reported out of committee. Two years
later Senator Tydings, of Maryland, succeeded in having inserted
into a bill for financing a program of self-liquidating federal works
projects a clause declaring it to be unlawful for any person to con-
tribute to any candidate for political office or to any political
committee or party "any amounts paid as dues, assessments, or
fees by members of any organization, lodge, or group, unless said
dues, assessments, or fees were paid by such members for the sole
purpose of aiding a particular candidate, political committee, or
political- party, and such members had actual knowledge that 'the
amounts so paid by them were to be used for such purpose." This
clause was accepted without debate and included in the bill as it
passed the Senate.8 No action was taken upon it by the House,
since the bill of which it was a part was not considered. Senator
Tydings' proposal, it will be observed, was less restrictive in its
terms thanthe. legislation recommended by the Lonergan Com-
mittee; but'-itwas in line with the Committee's views in that it
would havempplied to contributions by all types of pressure groups
and associations, and was not aimed solely at labor organizations.!
With the-enactment of the Second Hatch Act in 1940 political
contributions' by labor unions and other kinds of associations were
for the first time brought under legal limitation. Section 13 of that
Act" set a maximum limit of $5,000 on the amount any person
might contribute during a calendar year to any candidate for
elective federal office or to a national political committee. It also
prohibited the purchase of goods, commodities, advertising, or
articles of any kind where the proceeds of such purchase inure
directly or indirectly to the benefit of any such candidate or poli-
tical committee. A "person" to whom these restraints were made
applicable was defined as an "individual, partnership, committee,
association, corporation or any other organization or group of
persons"; and the term "contribution" was defined as "a gift,
5. S. 2712, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).
6. 84 Cong. Rec. 10436 (1939).
7. From the remarks of Senator Tydings, it appears that he had
specifically in mind in proposing the amendment the Pennsylvania Manu-
facturers Association as well as labor unions. Id. at 10304.
8. 54 Stat. 767 (1940), 18 U. S. C. A., sec. 61m (1947 Supp.), 18 U. S.
Code, sec. 608 (1948 rev.).
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subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money, or anything of
value." Although the House during consideration of the Hatch
Bill rejected an amendment offered by Representative Hoffman, of
Michigan, which by specific mention would have brought labor
unions under this limitation, 9 the language used in setting a ceiling
on individual contributions was broad enough to cover them. This
restriction proved to be no serious barrier to labor's support of
candidates and parties of its choice in the national elections of
1940. Smaller contributions by local unions well within the $5,000
limitation were made rather than larger ones by the national labor
organizations.'" The Special Senatorial Committee to Investigate
Campaign Expenditures in 1940, headed by Senator Gillette, of
Iowa, made no recommendations looking toward placing addi-
tional restraints on political activities by labor unions. The issue
was kept alive, however, by the introduction of various bills in
1941 and 1942 proposing to make political contributions by labor
unions illegal.
Legislation of this nature eventually was approved by Congress
in 1943 with the passage of the War Labor Disputes (Smith-
Connally) Act." This statute was largely the product of rising
resentment against John L. Lewis, who had defied the authority
of the War Labor Board in carrying through to a successful con-
clusion a strike by the United Mine Workers Union. During House
deliberations upon this measure, which had already passed the
Senate, Representative Harness, of Indiana, offered a substitute
for the bill as reported from committee, one feature of which was a
proposal to add "labor organizations" to the section of the Federal
9. 86 Cong. Rec. 9456-9458 (1940). Representative Hoffman also
proposed to place "labor organizations and any official or employee thereof"
under the same restraints as those imposed by the Hatch Act upon federal and
certain state administrative employees with respect to using their official
authority to interfere with or to affect the results of federal elections. The
Hoffman amendments were rejected in a division vote 86 to 50.
10. The Democratic National Committee reported 113 labor union con-
tributions in the 1940 election, totaling approximately $83,000. This amounted
to 6.2% of that Committee's contributions as compared with 5.1% of its
.contributions from this source in 1936. Labor unions also contributed more
than $50,000 of the total receipts of the National Committee of Independent
Voters for Roosevelt in the 1940 election. Because of John L. Lewis' en-
.dorsement of Wendell Willkie for President, the United Mine Workers,
which had given important financial support to the Democratic cause in
1936. was not a leading source of funds. One Tennessee local of this union
made a contribution of $100 to the Democratic National Committee: but
Labor's Non-Partisan League, essentially an adjunct of the United Mine
Workers Union, was listed as making an expenditure of $2,000 on behalf of
the Republican ticket. See Overacker. "Campaign Finance in the Presidential
Election of 1940," 35 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 701 (1941) and Sen. Rep. No. 47,
77th Cong., 1st Sess. 115 (1941).
11. 57 Stat. 163 (1943), 50 U. S. C., sees. 1501-1511 (1946).
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Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 prohibiting political contributions
by corporations.2- The Harness substitute, with this feature in-
cluded, was accepted by the House,1 3 and by the joint conference
committee to which the bill was then referred. During considera-
tion- of the conference committee report on the Smith-Connally
Bill in the Senate, this particular provision was sharply assailed
by several.Senators.14 It was criticized as being irrelevant to the
bill's major purpose; it was also alleged to be discriminatory in
that it proposed to lay restraints on labor groups which did not
apply to other associations, particularly those representing man-
agement interests. To meet these objections Senator Hatch, of
New-Mexico, in urging acceptance of the conference report, an-
nouncd that he intended to offer a new bill which would broaden
the prohibition on political contributions to include employer
groips.' 5 With an understanding that this would be done the
conference report was accepted by the Senate. A presidential veto
followed, but it was overridden by Congress. President Roosevelt
in his veto message cited the clause barring political contributions
as one of the objectionable features. This clause was not only
irrelevant to the bill's major objective, he maintained, but if there
was merit in such a prohibition it should be enacted as permanent
legislation and "careful consideration should be given to the appro-
priateness of extending the prohibition to other non-profit organi-
zations."' 6
Subsequently in the same session Senator Hatch introduced a
bill which would have amended the Federal Corrupt Practices Act
further by placing a ban on political contributions by "management
organizations." A "management organization" was defined as "any
business league, chamber of commerce, board of trade, employers'
organization, trade association, manufacturers' association, or any
other committee, association, organization or group representing
or designed to further the interests of any group of persons . . .
engaged in the operation or management of one or more types of
business enterprise." This bill was reported favorably and passed
without debate in the Senate on February 15, 1944.2- It failed to
be acted upon in the House.
12. 89 Cong. Rec. 5328, 5390 (1943).
13. A proposal by Representative Hancock, of New York, to delete the
anti-political contributions clause was defeated on a division vote, 156 to 83.
Id. at 5390.
14. Id. at 5754 if.
15. Id. at 5721.
16. Id. at 6488.
17. 89 Cong. Rec. 6503 (1943) ; 90 Cong. Rec. 1643 (1944) ; Sen. Rep.
No. 412, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEWV
ORIGINS OF THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT PROVISION
In a number of respects the Smith-Connally Act provision"
fell short of attaining the objective of complete proscription of the
use of labor union funds in elections. In the first place it was only
temporary legislation, since the law of which it was a part, by its
terms, was to expire within six months after termination of hostili-
ties as determined by the President, or sooner, upon the passage
of a concurrent resolution by Congress. By virtue of the President's
proclamation declaring an end to hostilities on December 31, 1946,"'
this termination date was June 30, 1947.20 Another shortcoming
was that this section of the War Labor Disputes Act did not
apply specifically to primary elections or other nominating pro-
cedures. Furthermore, it had no direct bearing upon labor union
contributions in connection with purely state or local elections or
primaries. Still another loophole was the failure of the federal
statute to state explicitly that direct expenditures of money by labor
unions on behalf of favored candidates or political parties were
prohibited.
These avenues for circumventing the policy of political "sterili-
zation" of labor union funds were quickly seized upon by certain
labor leaders. Having been advised by legal counsel that this section
of the War Labor Disputes Act did not prevent labor unions from
giving aid to candidates in state and local primaries and elections
and in national primary or pre-convention contests, or from making
direct expenditures in any election on behalf of candidates or pro-
grams favored by them,2 labor organizations affiliated with the
CIO, acting through the executive board of that body, set up a
Political Action Committee on July 7, 1943. Its function was to
organize, coordinate, and direct political activities in support of the
objectives of CIO unions in the elections of 1944. CIO labor
unions made contributions from their treasuries for financing the
work of the Committee, which was placed under the direction of
Sidney Hillman, president of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers
Union.
18. Section 9 of the Act; 50 U. S. C., sec. 1509 (1946).
19. Proc. 2714, 12 Fed. Reg. 1 (January, 1947).
20. It should be observed that Senator Hatch's bill in 1944 to extend the
restriction on political contributions to employer associations, which failed
because of House inaction, supra p. 5, would have made permanent legisla-
tion of the section of the War Labor Disputes Act prohibiting political con-
tributions by labor unions. Had this bill been enacted in 1944 it might have
averted reopening the issue in 1947 when legislation to continue a system of
governmental control over labor-management relations was under considera-
tion.
21. Cf. the opinion by Lee Pressman, counsel for the CIO, 12 Labor Re-
lations Reference Manual, 2544-2545 (1943).
[ Vol. 33:1
THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT
By early 1944 the CIO-PAC had received contributions from
affiliated unions to the amount of $670,000. These funds it began
to spend in the furtherance of union political objectives by promot-
ing the nomination of presidential and congressional candidates it
deemed to be friendly to labor's ,interests. In July, 1944, these
activities became a subject of inquiry before the Senate's Special
Committee to Investigate Campaign Expenditures in the 1944
election. Hillman appeared voluntarily before this Committee,
which was headed by Senator Green, of Rhode Island, and gave
a full report on the organization and activities of the CIO-PAC up
to that point.2 Hillman continued to maintain the point of view
that the anti-political contributions clause of the War Labor Dis-
putes Act had no bearing upon the activities which his organization
had so far been carrying on in connection with congressional pri-
maries and the national party conventions and that it did not bar
direct expenditures of union funds on behalf of favored candidates
even in the general election. Nevertheless, soon after this hearing
he sent out orders to the regional officers of the PAC directing
them to cease making expenditures in the national campaign from
funds derived from union treasuries. Funds of this nature were
thereafter to be spent only in* connection with state and local elec-
tions. To support continued activity of the PAC in the national
campaign, funds were to be sought through voluntary contribu-
tions from union members. Financed in this manner the CIO-PAC
and its affiliate, the National Citizens Political Action Committee,
played an active and important role in the congressional and presi-
dential campaighs in 1944.23 The final report of the Green Com-
mittee exonerated the CIO-PAC of any charge of dear-cut viola-
tion of the political contributions section of the War Labor Disputes
Act ;2' but these developments in the 1944 campaign gave rise
22. Hearings before the Special Committee to Investigate Presidential,
Vice Presidential and Senatorial Campaign Expenditures, 1944, pt. I, July 13,
1944, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess. Hillman reported that approximately $190,000 of
the $670,000 received from trade union sources by the CIO-PAC had been
expended by July, 1944, in connection with congressional primary elections
and national pre-convention activities.
23. Cf. Overacker, Presidential Campaign Funds 57 ff (1946); Gaer,
The First Round: The Story of the CIO-PAC (1944); Barbash, "Unions,
Government, and Politics," 1 Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 66, 73 ff
(1947).
24. Sen. Rep. No. 101, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1945). According to the
Committee's report, the CIO-PAC raised approximately $1,025,000 and spent
about $950,000. Its affiliate, the NCPAC, raised $380,000 and spent $378,000.
About $600,000 of, the CIO-PAC's contributions came from trade union treas-
uries; the remainder was raised through individual contributions from labor
union members. There was a surplus of about $170,000 in the trade union fund
account, as these funds were used after July 23 only in connection with state
and local elections.
1948]
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to a demand from certain quarters for adoption of a more stringent
regulatory law on the use of labor union funds in connection with
elections.
Two views regarding a future course of action were reflected
in the Green Committee report. The Republican members of the
Committee, Senators Ball, of Minnesota, and Ferguson, of Michi-
gan, urged amendment of existing federal corrupt practices legis-
lation so as to prohibit political expenditures by labor unions and
corporations in connection with federal elections. 25 The three
Democratic members, Senators Green, Tunnell, of Delaware, and
Stewart, of Tennessee, opposed this approach. They recommended
placing main reliance upon full and prompt publicity of individual
and group campaign expenditures and contributions as a deterrent
to improper action. In criticism of the approach suggested by the
minority members they pointed out the practical difficulty of draw-
ing a proper line of demarcation between expenditures for legiti-
mate educational or informational purposes and those for political
purposes.26 Bills representative of the respective viewpoints of the
majority and minority members of the Committee were introduced
in the 79th Congress, 2 but no action was taken upon them.
Following the 1946 elections both the House and Senate spe-
cial committees which investigated campaign expenditures in that
year made recommendations looking toward a tightening of federal
corrupt practices act restrictions, including regulations relating
to campaign contributions and expenditures by labor unions.- The
political expenditures section of the Taft-Hartley Act was in part a
25. Id. at 24, 83.
26. Id. at 83-84.
27. Representative of the views of the majority was S. 1261, introduced
by Senator Green in 1945. His bill would have made permanent the temporary
limitation upon labor union contributions to parties and candidates, and
would have extended this prohibition both as to labor unions and corporation%.
to the nominating stages in national elections. S. 1487, introduced in the same
session by Senator Wiley, of Wisconsin, would have carried out the recom-
mendations of Senators Ball and Ferguson by forbidding labor union and
corporate political expenditures as well as contributions. It would not have
applied these restrictions to primaries and conventions. In explanation of his
proposal, Senator Wiley stated that it was aimed particularly at the CIO-
PAC, which he expected his bill to put "out of the election business." 91
Cong. Rec. 9762-9764 (1946). For further elaboration of Senator Viley's
views on the issue see 92 Cong. Rec. (App.) 369-371 (1946).
28. H. R. Rep. No. 2739, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess. 39-40. 46 (1946)
Sen. Rep. No. 1, pt. 2, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 38-39 (1947). The House Com-
mittee was headed by Representative Priest, of Tennessee; the Senate Com-
mittee by Senator Ellender, of Louisiana. Both reports recommended exten-
sion of limitations on corporate and union contributions to include expendi-
tures; but the House Committee favored applying the restriction only to
general elections while the Senate Committee wished to extend it to pri-
maries and other nominating procedures.
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response to these recommendations. As was the case with the
similar provision in the War Labor Disputes Act, this section of
the Taft-Hartley Act was initiated by the House and acquiesced
in by the Senate, apparently with some reluctance.2 9 This feature
was subjected to considerable criticism in the Senate during con-
sideration of the conference report on the bill. Senator Taft, while
describing it as a "concession" which the Senate conferees had to
make in exchange for concessions on other points by the House
delegation, nevertheless defended it vigorouslyY° It was accepted
without change by the Senate as a part of the completed bill.
President Truman's veto message on the Taft-Hartley Bill 3
singled out the political contributions section of the measure as
particularly objectionable, just as President Roosevelt's veto
message had done with respect to the similar clause in the Smith-
Connally Bill. But as in the earlier instance, presidential dis-
approval was unavailing in preventing adoption of the legislation.
Thus the experiment in legislative control of political activities of
labor unions which had been launched by Congress in 1943 in a
tentative form was continued as permanent policy, on a broader
and more rigorous basis than before.
COMPARABLE STATE LEGISLATION
The movement to impose restraints by national law upon the
use of labor union funds for political purposes, which was ulti-
mately successful in the enactment of section 304 of the Taft-
Hartley Act in 1947, has had its counterpart in some degree at the
state level. Since 1943 laws of this nature have been passed by five
states, viz., Alabama, Texas, Colorado, Pennsylvania, and Dela-
ware. The Alabama statute, enacted in 1943, was the most com-
29. The Hartley Bill, H. R. 3020, as reported from committee contained
a section making corporate and union political contributions and expendi-
tures illegal, and extending this prohibition to the nominating stages in
national elections. It was accepted without change by the House. The Taft
Bill, S. 1126, omitted reference to the matter. However, at the time the
Taft-Hartley Bill was being considered by the Senate, a bill, S. 1173, spon-
sored by the members of the -Senate Committee on Campaign Expenditures in
1946, was introduced and referred to the Judiciary Committee. Section 112 of
this bill contained substantially the language incorporated in the final version
of the Taft-Hartley Bill on labor union and corporate political contributions
and expenditures. Cf. remarks of Senator Ellender, 93 Cong. Re. 6522
(1947).
30. Id. at 6436 if, 6522 ff.
31. Id. at 7503. The President's message termed the restriction a
"dangerous intrusion on free speech, unwarranted by any demonstration of
need, and quite foreign to the stated purposes of the bill." It also called
attention to the vagueness of. the language used, pointing out that it would
"raise a host of troublesome questions concerning the legality of many
practices ordinarily engaged in by newspapers and radio stations."
1948]
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prehensive of these laws in that it applied both to labor organ-
izations and to organizations of employers, and it forbade not only
contributions to political parties or candidates but also "expendi-
ture of funds in furtherance of the candidacy of any candidate for
public office" by either of such types of organizations. This section
of the Alabama statute,32 which dealt generally with the subject
of labor organizations, was declared invalid by the Supreme Court
of that state in 1944.' 3 The Texas law, 4 also passed in 1943, pro-
hibited only "financial contributions" by labor unions to political
parties or candidates. Its constitutionality has been sustained in
the state courts.3 5 The Colorado statute, adopted in 1943 as a part
of the Labor Peace Act, which required labor unions to incorporate,
forbade the use of a labor union corporation's funds "directly or in-
directly for political purposes of any kind."' When the section
relating to compulsory incorporation of labor unions was in-
validated by the Supreme Court of Colorado, the clause relating
to the use of labor union funds for political purposes fell with it.AT
In 1943 the Pennsylvania law regulating campaign expenditures,
which already prohibited contributions from corporations, was
revised to include "unincorporated associations .. . except those
formed primarily for political purposes" in the list of sources from
which candidates or political committees were forbidden to receive
contributions or loans.38 Although it did not specifically mention
labor associations this amendment to the existing law undoubtedly
was meant to cover them. A Delaware law of 194789 prohibited the
making of financial contributions by labor unions to political parties
32. Ala. Code, tit. 26, c. 8, sec. 392 (1945 Supp.).
33. The Court found that inclusion of organizations of employers along
with labor organizations in the section dealing with political activities violated
the provision in the Alabama Constitution which declares that every law
shall relate to only one subject. Since the general subject dealt with by the
statute was labor organizations, inclusion of employer organizations in the
restrictive provision was not permissible. The regulation applicable to em-
ployer organizations paralleled a similar regulation of labor unions; con-
sequently invalidation of the former made it necessary to invalidate the latter,
since the two must stand or fall together. Alabama State Federation of Labor
v. McAdory,.246 Ala. 1, 18 So. (2d) 810 (1944) ; cert. dismissed on other
grounds, 325 U. S. 450 (1945).
34. 15 Vernon's Civil Statutes, Anno., Art. 5154a. sec. 4b.
35. American Federation of Labor v. Mann, 188 S. W. (2d) 276 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1945).
36. Colo. Stat., Anno. (Michie, 1947 Supp.), c. 97, see. 94 (20)(4) (c).
37. American Federation of Labor v. Reilly, 113 Colo. 90, 115 P.
(2d) 145 (1944).
38. 25 Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes, Anno. (1948 Supp.), sec.
3235 (b).
39. Del. Laws 1947, c. 196, sec. 23.
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or candidates for campaign expenses; it also prohibited the solicita-
tion of funds by labor unions on behalf of political parties or
candidates.
In 1946 an attempt was made to amend by popular initiative
the Massachusetts law relating to corporate contributions and
expenditures by including within its scope "labor unions or any
person acting in behalf thereof." Petitions to bring about a popular
vote on the proposal were filed; but before the vote was taken
the validity of the proposal was attacked successfully by the State
Fedration of Labor. The State Supreme Court found the initiated
measure to be violative of the guarantees of freedom of press and
assembly set forth in the Massachusetts Constitution, and there-
fore not to be within the power given the electorate by the initiative
article of that document.40 It was accordingly ruled off the referen-
dum ballot.
SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY
Section 313 of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, as amended
by the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, 1 sets up prohibitions upon the
40. Bowe v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 320 Mass. 230, 69 N. E.
(2d) 115 (1946).
41. 61 Stat. 159, 2 U. S. C., sec. 251 (1947 Supp.) ; 18 U. S. Code,
sec. 610 (1948 rev.). The provision in the Federal Corrupt Practices Act
which the Taft-Hartley clause amends was originally adopted in 1907 at
the strong urging of President Theodore Roosevelt. Cf. Sikes, State and Fed-
eral Corrupt Practices -Legislation 188-94 (19-8). With amendments in-
troduced by section 304 of the Taft-Hartley Act indicated by italics, it now
reads:
"It is unlawful for any national bank, or any corporation organ-
ized by authority of any law of Congress, to make a contribution
or expenditure in connection with any election to any political office,
or in comection with any primary election or political convention
or caucus held to select candidates for any political office, or for any
corporation whatever, or any labor organiation to make a contribu-
tion or expenditure in connection with any election at which Presi-
dential and Vice Presidential electors or a Senator or Representa-
tive in, or a Delegate or Resident Commissioner to Congress are to
be voted for, or in connection with any primary election or political
convention or caucus held to select cmdidates for any of the fore-
going offices, or for any candidate, political committee, or other per-
son to accept or receive any contribution prohibited by this section.
Every corporation or labor organization which makes any contribu-
tion or expenditure in violation of this section shall be fined not more
than $5,000; and every officer or director of any corporation, or
officer of any labor organization, who consents to any contribution
or expenditure by the corporation or labor organization, as the case
may be, in violation of this section shall be fined not more than $1,000
or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both. For the purposes
of this section "labor organication" means any organization of any
kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan,
in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, its
whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerizing grivances,
labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or condi-
tions of work."
1948]
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making of campaign contributions and expenditures in two differ-
ent areas of control. National banks and corporations organized
under the authority of Congress are forbidden to make contribu-
tions or expenditures in connection with any election to any office,
national, state, or local, or with any primary, caucus or political
convention held to select candidates for public office.4 2 Corpora-
tions, in general, and labor organizations are likewise forbidden to
make political contributions or expenditures, but only in connection
with primaries, conventions and caucuses for nominating candidates
for national offices and with general elections at which such officers
are chosen. The term "labor organizations" is defined compre-
hensively, and is not limited merely to those labor unions which
fall under the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board
by reason of their connection with interstate commerce. Criminal
penalties to a maximum of a $5,000 fine may be assessed against
corporations or labor organizations violating the act; and officers
of such corporations or labor organizations responsible for per-
mitting violations are made subject to a maximum fine of $1,000
or one year's imprisonment, or both. Neither the term "expendi-
ture" nor the phrase "in connection with any election" is defined.
Obviously both are subject to a wide latitude of interpretation.4"
Just what did Congress intend to make criminal by these vague
and sweeping prohibitions? Where is the line to be drawn between
expenditures made in carrying on legitimate informational and edu-
cational activities on the one hand and unlawful expenditures for
political purposes on the other? At what point do expenditures
for political objectives begin to be expenditures "in connection
with" an election? The general objective, as stated by sponsors
of this section of the law in Congress, was to "plug up loopholes"
which had appeared in the existing laws. Corporations and labor
unions were to be placed under equal restraints with respect to giv-
ing financial aid to parties or candidates. Indirect political contribu-
tions in the guise of expenditures of money were to be made unlawffui,
as well as direct contributions. 44 Aside from the question of uncon-
42. A section of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, it
should be noted, prohibits political contributions by registered holding comn-
panies or subsidiaries thereof in connection with either nomination or Election
of any public officers, or to any political party or committee. See 15
U. S. C. A., sec. 79 1(n). It was held to apply in the election of members of
a state legislature in Egan v. United States, 137 F. (2d) 369 (CCA 8th
1943), cert. den., 320 U. S. 788 (1943).
43. Cf. Mulroy, "The Taft-Hartley Act in Action," 15 Univ. of Chi.
L. Rev. 595, at 627 ff (1948).
44. Senator Taft stated the general objective in the following words:
"What we are proposing to do is to subject labor organizations to exactly
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stitutionality which naturally arises because of the vagueness of
the statute in defining the acts which it makes criminal, it must
be observed that this provision exhibits a truly remarkable trust
in the omniscience of the Department of Justice and the judiciary
to determine the-actual intent of the legislative body and in their
capacity to -shape a "blunderbuss" regulation into a workable, fair
and -effective rule for achieving the desired ends.
Specific evidences of Congressional views concerning the scope
and meaning of the prohibitory section are found in the Senate
debates when the conference report on the bill was under con-
sideration. Senators Pepper of Florida, Barkley of Kentucky, Kil-
gore of West Virginia, and Magnuson of Washington, all of whom
opposed the measure, raised a number of questions concerning its
probable bearing upon various kinds of labor union and corporate
activities. They were answered by Senators Taft, Ball, and Ellender,
who supported it. In response to questions relative to the appli-
cability of the proposed regulation to the publication of political
endorsements in union newspapers and periodicals, Senator Taft
expressed the view repeatedly that it would apply if the periodical
or newspaper were supported by funds derived from union dues."
Likewise an- association which includes corporate members, e.g.,
the National Association of Manufacturers, could not publish
political endorsements in an organ supported out of membership
dues.4 6 According to Senator Taft, the prohibitory section would
not, however, prevent publication of such endorsements in union
newspapers supported by voluntary subscriptions :4 nor would
it prevent a corporate-owned newspaper from giving editorial sup-
-port to a candidate or a party so long as it was done in the process
of "running a newspaper as a business. '4 8 If corporate-owned
newspapers or union periodicals containing political endorsements
should be given away rather than sold for what they are worth,
that would constitute a violation of the law, in the view of both
Senator Taft and Senator Ball.4 9 The mere publication of the
voting records of members of Congress in a union periodical sup-
the same prohibitions to which corporations have been subjected, and so far
as I know, including the things which the original law [i.e., the Federal
Corrupt Practices Act as amended by the War Labor Disputes Actl covered
but regarding which doubt was raised bi labor organizations." 93 Cong.Rec 6436 (1947). .......45. Id. at 6436, 6437, 6440. A similar view was expressed by Senator
Ellender, id. at 6440.
46. Id. at 6438.
47. Id. at 6437.
48. Id. at 6436.
49. Id. at 6437.
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ported out of union dues or the broadcasting of such information
on a corporate-financed news program would not be prohibited
unless such reports were "colored" and amounted to an actual
"contribution" to particular parties or candidates."0 The purchase
of political advertising or of radio time for political speech-making
out of union funds or corporate funds would be prohibited.0'
Further questioning raised points concerning the applicability of
the proposed regulation to expression of political views by corpo-
ration-sponsored radio commentators or by newspapers indirectly
subsidized through corporate advertising. Senator Taft eventually
took refuge in the statement that the particular facts of each case
would necessarily be determinative; that there would be border-
line cases of "all degrees"; and that such questions of interpretation
would have to be left to the courts to determine.52
Opportunity to supply answers on some of these questions has
been presented to the courts in two cases to date. Within a few
weeks after passage of the act, Philip Murray, President of the
CIO, caused to be published in the CIO NEWS, a periodical pub-
lished under union auspices and financed out of members' dues,
an editorial endorsing the candidacy of the Democratic nominee
at a special election to be held in the Third Congressional District
of Maryland on July 15, 1947. A thousand extra copies of the
edition containing the endorsement were printed and distributed
among union members of the district shortly before the election.
On the basis of assertions made by advocates of the Taft-Hartley
Act during Congressional debates, the actions of Murray and
the CIO, under the circumstances, were in violation of the law.
Murray and the CIO were promptly indicted by a federal grand
jury. The District Court, holding that the section of the act re-
lating to political expenditures by a labor union was an uncon-
stitutional infringement on rights guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment, sustained a motion for dismissal of the indictment.53 An
appeal from this ruling by the government brought the case before
the Supreme Court.
That tribunal unanimously sustained the lower court's dismissal
of the indictment; but over the objections of four Justices it based
its ruling on the point that the statute did not prohibit an expendi-
50. Id. at 6447.
51. Id. at 6439, 6440, 6447.
52. Id. at 6439.
53. United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations et al., 77 F.
Supp. 355 (D. Dist. of Col., 1948).
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ture of union funds in the circumstances of this case.' Mr. Justice
Reed, speaking for the majority, chose to adopt a narrow view
of the intent of Congress in adding the word "expenditure" to the
term "contribution" found in the earlier law. After review of the
Congressional hearings and debates on the point, he expressed
the opinion that Congress intended by adding "expenditures" to
the prohibitory section "to eradicate the doubt that had been raised
as to the reach of 'contribution,' not to extend greatly the coverage
of that section." 55 The learned Justice went on to say, "It would
require explicit words in an act to convince us that Congress
intended to bar a trade journal, a house organ, or a newspaper,
published by a corporation, from expressing views on candidates
or political proposals in the regular course of its publication. It is
unduly stretching language to say that the members or stock-
holders are unwilling participants in such normal organizational
activities, including the advocacy thereby of governmental policies
affecting their interests and the support thereby of candidates
thought to be favorable to their interests."5 Under the well-known
rule of strict necessity, it was thus possible for the Court to dispose
of the case-without considering the constitutional issue upon which
the lower court had based its ruling. This question was passed over
with no indication of the views of the majority of the Court.
In a separate .opinion, Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurred with
the majority in its finding on the inapplicability of the statute
under the circumstances of the case. He expressed the further view
that the manner by which the constitutional issue had been brought
to the Supreme Court for decision bordered on collusion. Govern-
ment counsel, he maintained, had failed in the lower court pro-
ceedings to advance "the most effective and the least misappre-
hending grounds for supporting what Congress had enacted" to
meet the contention of unconstitutionality raised by the defense3-
In still another opinion, Mr. Justice Rutledge, who was joined
by Justices Douglas, Black and Murphy, concurred in the result,
but not in the reasoning of the majority on the grounds for sus-
taining the lower court's dismissal of the indictment. Mr. Justice
Rutledge, after a careful and complete survey of the Congressional
debates and hearings, concluded that it was the clear intent of
Congress to bar expenditures by a labor union in circumstances
54. United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations et. al., 68 S.
Ct. 1349 (1948). .
55. Id. at 1357.
56. Ibid.
57. Id. at 1360.
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like those of the case at hand. He pointed out that Senator Taft
had repeatedly referred to the nature of the source of funds and
to the necessity for protecting the rights of minority members of
unions as guiding principles in determining whether the act should
apply in a given situation. Consequently, the acts involved in the
case were covered by the statute and the constitutionality issue
was properly before the Court. 8 Turning to this aspect of the case,
Mr. Justice Rutledge found that the reasons advanced in support
of the restrictive provisions of the statute were not sufficient to
justify the resulting curtailment of the rights of free speech, free
press, and petition guaranteed by the First Amendment and by
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Accordingly, he
concluded that the indictment was properly dismissed by the lower
court on the ground of invalidity of the statute so far as it dealt
with expenditures by labor unions.
The second case which has arisen tinder section 304 of the
Taft-Hartley Act originated in Hartford, Connecticut. In what
was reported to be a deliberate attempt to institute a test of the
constitutionality of this section of the law, a local union of the
Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and Paperhangers, AFL, in
January, 1948, purchased space in the Hartford Times for a
political advertisement and radio time for a political broadcast
over a New Britain, Connecticut, station. The objective of the
publicity was to bring about the defeat of Senator Taft for the
Republican nomination for President, and to prevent renomination
and re-election of those Connecticut Representatives in Congress
who voted for the Taft-Hartley Act. The union and its president
were indicted. In overruling a motion by the defense to dismiss the
indictment, the District Court declared that it was "abundantly
plain" that Congress intended to bring such actions within the
scope of the law.59
58. Justice Rutledge took the majority strongly to task for "rewriting"
the statute as a means of evading the constitutional issue. Emphasizing this
point in his opinion, Justice Rutledge declared: "I doubt that upon any matter
of construction the Court has heretofore so far presumed to override the
plainly and incontrovertibly stated judgment of all participants in the legis-
lative process with its own tortuously fashioned view. This is not con-
struction under the doctrine of strict necessity. It is invasion of the legis-
lative process by emasculation of the statute. The only justification for this
is to avoid deciding the question of validity." Id. at 1365.
59. United States v. Painters Local Union No. 481, 79 F. Supp. 516.
(July 28, 1948). Hincks, D. J. The constitutional issue was also raised by
the defendants on the motion to dismiss; but the Court held that the pertinent
provision of the Taft-Hartley Act, in the circumstances of the case, did not
violate the First Amendment.
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The interpretation given the act by the District Court in this
proceeding was undoubtedly in accord with the intent of Congress.
If the prohibition on union expenditures for political purposes
means anything at all, it certainly covers the making of outlays
for objects such as newspaper advertising and radio time. It is
difficult, however, to accept the reasoning of the Supreme Court's
majority opinion in the CIO News case on the scope of the pro-
hibitory section. Had there been no printing and distribution of
extra copies of the labor periodical in that case, it would be easier
to follow Mr. Justice Reed's reasoning to the conclusion he reaches.
W"Then additional expense was incurred by the union in this manner,
for the obvious purpose of influencing the result of an election
by disseminating an expression of political opinion and a specific
endorsement of a candidate for Congress, it would appear that the
union was making an "expenditure" of funds in contravention of
the law. There is little or no difference between such an expendi-
ture and one made for direct purchase'of advertising space or for
the printing and distribution of handbills with the same object
in view. Both involve the expenditure of union funds for political
objectives which presumably some members might not approve.
Senator Taft and Senator Ball in the Senate debates both ex-
pressed the view that one of the kinds of expenditure at which
the provision was directed was the printing and distribution of
"throw-away" copies of periodicals containing political endorse-
ments.
60
It is evident from the tone of the opinions in the CIO Newzs
case that there was violent disagreement among the Supreme Court
Justices over whether it should oblige the litigants by making a
ruling on the. constitutionality issue. Coming as it would on the
eve of a presidential election campaign a pronouncement on this
point would be heavily freighted with political significance. The
path of narrow -construction. afforded a 'vay out of the difficulty. It
had the happy result of resolving in advance a great many questions
-which were certain to arise in the immediate future concerning
the applicability of the law to the .publication of political views
60. 93 Cong. Rec. 6437 (1947). While the CIO News case was pending
in the District Court the report of the joint Committee to survey the
operation of the Taft-Hartley Act was made. Commenting on this case the
report observed that "if the allegations of fact are correct, the case squarely
presents the application of the law to a newspaper supported out of general
union funds when it goes beyond its usual course of business in support of a
-candidate for federal public office." Sen. Rep. No. 986, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess.
39 (1948). The defendants in the case made no attempt to controvert the
allegations in the ifidictment.
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and endorsements in union-supported and corporate-owned peri-
odicals and newspapers. But in reaching its conclusion the Court,
as Mr. Justice Rutledge pointed out in his concurring opinion, re-
jected as guides to interpretation of the act the principles which ad-
vocates of the measure had apparently intended to be governing. The
Court ignored the very reasons which sponsors of the section had
advanced in justifying it. By giving only a negative answer on
the meaning of the term "expenditure" the Court has raised new
queries regarding the effect of the prohibitory clause. What it does
prohibit-indeed, whether it has added anything of material con-
sequence to the previously existing prohibition on political con-
tributions by labor unions-has yet to be disclosed. No doubt,
cases arising during the course of the recent national political
campaign will eventually produce more conclusive answers by the
Supreme Court on this point.
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY ISSUE
The constitutional basis upon which the anti-political expen-
ditures and contributions provision of the Taft-Hartley Act rests,
so far as it concerns labor unions, is the clause in Article I,
section 4 of the Constitution which grants to Congress the power
to regulate "the times, places and manner of holding elections"
of members of Congress and the "necessary and proper" clause of
Article I, section 8, which gives Congress a broad implied authority
to protect against fraud and corruption the choosing of national
officers.81 The basic constitutional issue posed by the regulation
is whether Congress in the exercise of this broad power over
federal elections has unduly infringed upon individual rights
protected by the First and Fifth Amendments.
A considerable body of judicial opinion has been produced by
American courts on the general subject of the constitutionality
of state and federal corrupt practices acts.62 Through judicial
rulings it has been established that Congress, with respect to
national elections, and the state legislatures, with respect to public
elections generally, have constitutional power to prohibit political
contributions by corporations to candidates, parties or political
61. Cf. Burroughs and Cannon v. United States, 290 U. S. 534 (1934) ;
United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299 (1941) ; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110
U. S. 651 (1884).
62. For review and comment on decisions of this nature see the notes
in 69 ALR 377 (1930) and 167 ALR 1465 (1947) ; also Beacham, "Federal
Regulation of Political Activity," 19 Miss. L. Jr. 210 (1948) and Heady,
"The Hatch Act Decisions," 19 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 687 (1947).
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committees ;6 to fimit the amount of money that may be expended
by a candidate or a party committee ;(4 to require publicity and an
accounting of amounts, sources, and purposes of expenditures by
candidates, parties or political committees;65 to protect govern-
mental employees against coercion in the raising of campaign
funds ; 6 and to restrict engagement in political part), affairs by
certain classes of governmental officers or employees.0 7 State and
federal constitutional guarantees of individual freedom were not
considered to have been improperly restricted by legislative
restraints of the kind here indicated. 8 In a number of instances,
however, state courts have invalidated certain provisions of state
corrupt practices act regulating the amount of money that may
be expended by candidates and requiring reports on amounts,
sources, and purposes of expenditure; but the grounds for in-
validity have lain in the nature of the penalty imposed, the manner
of enforcement, or the remedial procedures.0 9
In all of the above-mentioned types of corrupt practices act
provisions, it will be noted that the burden of regulation falls pri-
marily upon political parties, political committees, candidates, or
governmental officers or employees. Where state laws have at-
tempted to establish limitations on the right of an individual citizen
to express and promote his political views, or have sought to
"muzzle" even candidates to an unreasonable degree, the courts
63. United States v. United States Brewers' Association, 239 Fed. 163
(W.D. Pa. 1916) ; Egan v. United States and Union Electrical Company v.
United States, 137 F. (2d) 369 (C.C.A. 8th 1943), cert. den., 320 U. S. 788
(1943) ; People v. Gansley, 191 Mich. 357, 158 N. W. 195 (1916) ; Smith Y.
Higinbothom, 187 Md. 115, 48 A. (2d) 754 (1946). In the last-cited case the
state law involved was construed not to prohibit an incorporated local bar
association from conducting a "bar primary" on judicial candidates and
publishing the results. Accord, La Belle v. Hennepin County Bar Association,
206 Minn. 290, 288 N. W. 788 (1939).
64. State v. Russell, 20 Ohio C. C. 551, 11 Ohio C. D. 299 (1900) ; State
ex rel. LaFollette v. Kohler, 200 Wis. 518, 228 N. W. 895 (1930) ; Adams v.
Lansdon, 18 Idaho 483, 110 Pac. 280 (1910).
65. Burroughs and Cannon v. United States, 290 U. S. 534 (1934) ; State
ex rel. LaFollette v. Kohler, supra note 64.
66. Ex parte Curtis, 106 U. S. 371 (1882) ; United States v. Wurzbach,
280 U. S. 396 (1930).
67. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75 (1947) ; Oklahoma
v. United States Civil Service Commission, 330 U. S. 127 (1947); Mc-
Auliffe v. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N. E. 517 (1891).
68. There was dissent by Justice Bradley on this point in the Curtis
case, supra note 66; and by Black and Rutledge, JJ, in the United Public
Workers case, supra note 67.
69. State ex rel. Schumacher v. Markham, 160 Wis. 431, 152 N. W. 161
(1915) ; McKinney v. Barker, 180 Ky. 526, 203 S. XV. 303 (1918) ; Bradley
v. Clark, 133 Cal. 106, 65 Pac. 395 (1901) ; State v. Russell. 20 Ohio C. C.
551, 11 Ohio C. D. 299 (1900); In re Lance, 55 Misc. 13, 106 N. Y. Supp.
211 (1907).
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have sometimes overthrown them. Thus a provisibn in a Wisconsin
corrupt practices act which prohibited a private citizen, not a
candidate or a member of a political committee, from spending
money on an election campaign in a county other than his own, was
held to violate the free speech and press guarantees of the State
Constitution. ° A Nebraska law designed to enforce non-parti-
sanism in the election of certain officers was also overthrown on
similar grounds.71
Because of its impact upon the freedom of individuals organized
into an association to carry on political activities directly related
to the welfare of the members of the group, the prohibition on
political expenditures by labor unions is the most vulnerable part
of section 304 of the Taft-Hartley Act, from the viewpoint of
constitutionality.72 The prohibition on contributions by labor unions
to political parties and candidates, which was established originally
by the War Labor Disputes Act in 1943, is less vulnerable to attack,
and spokesmen for organized labor have exhibited much less
concern about it. No attempt was made to initiate a test of its
constitutionality during the period when the War Labor Disputes
Act was in force.7 3 A similar provision in a Texas statute was
challenged; but its constitutionality was sustained by the Texas
Court of Civil Appeals.7 4 The issue was not pressed further.
The prohibition on union expenditures involves a more serious
invasion of political freedom. Individuals acting in concert as
members of labor unions undoubtedly have rights guaranteed
by the First and Fifth Amendments which limit the authority
of Congress in dealing with them, and by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment which limits in similar degree the authority of the states.'7
Freedom of speech, press, assembly and petition are rights viewed
by the courts as having special significance in our system of demo-
70. State v. Pierce, 163 Wis. 615, 158 N. W. 696 (1916).
71. State ex rel. Ragan v. Junkin, 85 Neb. 1, 122 N. W. 473 (1909)
see also Louthan v. Commonwealth, 79 Va. 196 (1884).
72. Cf. Sutherland, "The Constitutionality of the Taft-Hartley Law."
I Industrial and Labor Relations Review 177, 183 (1948).
73. In De Mille v. American Federation of Radio Artists, 187 P. (2d)
769 (Cal. 1947), affirming 175 P. (2d) 851, cert. den., 333 U. S. 876 (1948),
it was held that this section of the War Labor Disputes Act did not prohibit
an assessment by a union on its membership to raise funds for opposing rati-
fication of a proposed anti-closed shop amendment. Accord. Warner v. Screen
Office Employees Guild, 16 Lab. Rel. Ref. Man. 544 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1945).
74. American Federation of Labor v. Mann, 188 S. W. (2d) 276 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1945).
75. Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S. 496
(1939); Local 309, United Furniture Workers of America, CIO v. Gates,
75 F. Supp. 620 (N.D., Ind. 1948).
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cratic government because of the fundamental importance they bear
in the maintenance and functioning of that system. For this reason,
the Supreme Court has stated, "only the gravest abuses, endanger-
ing paramount interests, give occasion for permissible legislation.""
The position that will be taken by the Supreme Court on the
constitutionality of the political expenditures feature of the law,
as it concerns labor unions, can, of course, only be conjectured.
It will be governed by the outcome of a weighing of the immediacy
and importance of the asserted dangers in unrestricted expendi-
ture of union funds in elections as against the resulting encroach-
ment upon freedom of political action by an association of indi-
viduals organized to promote their economic welfare. The CIO
News case revealed the significant fact that four of the present
members believe that Congress with this type of restriction has
unduly infringed upon rights guaranteed by the First Amendment
and by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Wholesale
denial of the right of a labor association to expend its funds for
the purpose of influencing elections, they declared, could not be
justified on the grounds that such restriction was necessary to
keep elections pure, to prevent undue influence by labor groups
upon governmental policies, or to protect the financial interests of
minority elements in those organizations. 7 Lower court rulings,
with one exception, support this view .7 There would seem to be
a strong likelihood that when the issue is finally faced, a majority
of the Supreme Court will accept the thinking already subscribed
to by Mr. justice Rutledge and his supporting brethren on this
point.
The constitutionality of that part of the provision which con-
cerns direct contributions by labor unions to parties or candidates
stands on somewhat firmer ground. The "purity of elections" and
76. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516. 530 (1945). For other declarations
in this vein see Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 95 (1940) ; De Jonge V.
Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 364 (1937) ; Grosjean v. American Press Co.. Inc.,
297 U. S. 233, 250 (1936); Craig v. Harney, 331 U. S. 367, 383 (1947),
Murphy, J., concurring.
77. United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations et al.. 68
S. Ct. 1349, 1366 ff (1948).
78. United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations et al.. 77 F.
Supp. 355 (1948). supra p. 14; Bowe v. Secretary of the Connnonwealth.
320 Mass. 230, 69 N. E. (2d) 115 (1946), supra p. 1. Invalidations of
political expenditures limitations on labor unions in Alabama and Colorado
were based on reasons other than interference with individual rights. Supra
. 10 and note 33. In United States v. Painters Local Union No. 481. et al.
79 F. Supp. 516 (1948), supra p. 16. however, tie Court declared that the
Taft-Hartley Act limitation on political expenditures "was not invalidatel
by its incidental effect in restraint upon the freedoms protected by the First
Amendment."
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"undue influence" arguments have greater validity as justifications,
since the affairs and conduct of political parties and their candidates
for public office are involved in a more direct sense. What might
prove to be the fatal constitutional infirmity of this feature of
the law is its discriminatory character. So long as other associations,
particularly employer associations representing economic and politi-
cal interests in opposition to those of organized labor, are left
free to make contributions to political parties or candidates, a
strong argument can be raised against the constitutionality of it law
which singles out labor unions for repressive regulation.7 As has
been seen, efforts in Congress to make this feature of the law fairer
by including within its scope associations representative of em-
ployer interests have so far been unsuccessful.
There is a possibility that the Taft-Hartley Act restriction on
union political activities will be liberalized by Congress even before
a determination of its constitutionality in its present form is made
by the Supreme Court. Shortly after the passage of the law, Senator
Hatch, of New Mexico, and Senator Aiken, of Vermont, introduced
a bill which would have stricken from the act the prohibition on
expenditures by labor unions for political purposes.8 0 Later Repre-
sentative McDonough, of California, introduced an amendatory bill
which would permit labor unions to make expenditures for political
purposes, provided the members thereof vote to make union funds
available for such use.81 Neither bill was acted upon; but they were
79. In the United Public Workers case, supra note 67, a dissent by
Black, J., emphasized strongly as grounds for invalidity the discriminatory
aspect of the Hatch Act limitations on political activities by government em-
ployees.
80. S. 1613, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). The bill would not have
repealed the prohibition on political expenditures by corporations, nor the
prohibition on direct contributions to parties and candidates by labor unions.
81. H. R. 4193, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1948). The McDonough proposal
is suggestive of present British policy in dealing with the problem of labor
union political expenditures. In the case of Amalgamated Society of Railway
Servants v. Osborne, [1910] A. C. 87, decided Dec. 21, 1909, it was held that
political contributions by labor unions were illegal because this activity (lid
not lie within the statutory powers of registered trade unions. In 1913 the
Parliament modified this ruling by incorporating into the Trade Union Act of
that year (2 and 3 Geo. V, c. 30) provisions authorizing trade unions to ex-
pend their funds for political purposes as broadly defined in the act, provided(1) a majority of the union members voting by secret ballot at a meeting for
this purpose approved the principle of creating a political fund and (2) any
union member could claim exemption from political assessments by a written
statement so indicating his desire. These restrictions were made stronger in
the Trade Disputes and Trade Union Act of 1927 (17 and 18 Geo. V, c. 22).
which required that assessments for political purposes must be kept in a fund
separate from general union funds, and that before a member could be assessed
for the political fund he must indicate in writing his willingness to be so
assessed. In other words, the emphasis was changed from "contracting out"
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indicative of a feeling in the 80th Congress that the harshness of
the restrictive legislation should be mitigated in some degree.
In its first report on March 15, 1948, the Joint Committee set
up by the Taft-Hartley Act to observe its operation and make
recommendation for needed changes gave attention to this feature
of the law. A majority of the members of the Committee preferred
to follow a policy of watchful waiting, pending disclosure of judicial
attitudes on the scope and application of the section.s2 A minority
report, signed by four members of the Committee, was filed on
April 1, shortly after the expenditures provision had been held
unconstitutional by the District Court in the CIO News case. They
urged immediate repeal of the ban on labor union expenditures."
No doubt the subsequent ruling of the Supreme Court, holding that
the act does not cover publication of political endorsements in
union-supported periodicals, has served to diminish in considerable
measure the sentiment in Congress for repeal or modification of the
expenditures feature.
CONCLUSION
In any event, the assumptions upon which the Taft-Hartley Act
restraints on political activities of labor unions rest will continue
to be questioned in Congress and in the national forum. This legis-
lation proceeds on the assumptions (1) that of all the many kinds
of pressure group organizations which spend money to influence
elections, only labor unions, along with corporations, threaten
the purity of our elections and the capacity of the government to
function in the general interest; (2) that minority members of labor
unions are unjustly exploited by the majority by being compelled
to give financial assistance in carrying on political programs to
which they do not subscribe; and (3) that the effective, practical
way to prevent these evils and wrongs is to pass laws making the
use of union funds in connection with elections a crime. Without
attempting to examine each of these assumptions at length, it
may be observed that with regard to the first loint there is reason
to secure exeniption to "tontracting in" to insure liability. In 1946. by re-
pealing the Trade Dispute and Trade Union Act of 1927, the present Labor
Government returned to the "contracting out" system of the 1913 law. Cf.
Rothschild, "Government Regulation of Trade Unions in Great Britain: II,"
38 Columbia Law Review 1335 at 1356 if, 1379 (1938) and 4 Labor and In-
dustry in Britain, at 40, 78 (1946).
82. Sen. Rep. No. 986, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. 39 (1948). Senator Ball,
of Minnesota, was chairman of the Committee.
83. Sen. Rep. No. 986, SOth Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. 2, 15 (1948). The
minority was made up of Senators Pepper, of Florida. and Murray, of
Montana, and Representatives Lesinski, of Michigan, and Kelley, of Penn-
sylvania.
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for believing that, on the whole, more good than harm will result
from use of their common funds by labor unions to stimulate inter-
est and activity in political affairs among the rank and file of their
organizations. If the democratic system of government is sound
it will thrive and be strengthened by group activities which tend
to produce a better informed, more politically active citizenry.
Competing group interests can be trusted to prevent a wholly
distorted, self-interested viewpoint from becoming dominant in
national policy, so long as the channels of information and political
debate are kept free.
On the second point it should be noted that the need for laws
protecting the minority in a labor union against expenditure of
the common funds on political projects which they may have no
interest in supporting is not the same as the need for laws of this
nature on behalf of the stockholders in a business corporation.
The purposes for which a labor union is formed are not the same
as those which give rise to a business corporation. s In increasing
numbers the constitutions or charters of labor organizations state
as one of the objectives of such associations the furtherance of
interests of their members through advocacy of public policies and
support of candidates deemed favorable to labor's welfare and
84. A number of states recognize the distinction between ordinary
business corporations and those formed for charitable or political purposes
by exempting the latter from prohibitions on the expenditure of funds for
political objectives. Cf. 25 Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes, Anno., sec. 3225
(b) (1947 Supp.) ; 39 McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York, sec 671.
85. This point was well expressed by the Supreme Court of California
in a recent case. The question involved was the right of a local union to im-
pose an assessment of one dollar on each member for the purpose of raising
a fund to be used in opposing popular ratification of a proposed anti-closed
shop amendment to the California State Constitution. The Court upheld the
authority of the union to make the assessment against the contention that
it infringed upon the constitutional rights of a member who personally favored
adoption of the amendment. The analogy between the functioning of a labor
association and of a governmental body in this respect was commented on
by the Court as follows:
"Majority rule necessarily prevails in all constitutional govern-
ment, including our federal, state, county and municipal bodies, else
payment of a tax levied for a duly authorized and proper objective
could be avoided by the mere assertion of beliefs and sentiments
opposed to the accomplishment thereof. In a government based on
democratic principles the benefit as perceived by the majority pre-
vails. And the individual citizen would raise but a faint cry of
invasion of his constitutional rights should he seek to avoid his
obligations because of a difference in personal views. A member of
a voluntary association should not be permitted successfully to seek
a similar avoidance." De Mille v. American Federation of Radio
Artists. 31 Cal. (2d) 139. 187 P. (2d) 769. 776 (1947), affirming,
175 P. (2d) 851; cert. den.. 333 U. S. 876, 906 (1948). Accord.
Warner v. Screen Office Employees Guild (Cal. Super. Ct.) 16
Lab. Rel. Ref. Man. 544 (1945).
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through carrying on political educational programs among the
membership. The implication is that the individual member, in
joining the organization, approves of its carrying on such activities,
although he may not endorse specific actions taken by the leader-
ship in this sphere. But so long as the organization leadership is
responsible to the membership for decisions it makes and there are
democratic processes for expression of criticisms of those decisions
by the rank and file, the dissident individual member has no just
ground for complaint.8 5 Labor unions need to be governed by the
rule of unanimity in these matters no more than in other matters
such as, for example, the terms of a collective bargaining agreement.
On the last point it may be said that the experience in the past
with the punitive, negative approach to the problem of money in
elections does not augur well for success of this approach as con-
cerns the use of labor union funds for political purposes. Experi-
ence in the related matter of prohibition of political contributions
by corporations demonstrates that, while this kind of regulation
may be generally observed in the letter, indirect or hidden con-
tributions from corporate sources are still a factor in political
campaign finance.8, More emphasis upon prompt and complete
publicity rather than upon limitation and prohibition may well
be the answer to the problem as it relates to sources as well as to
amounts of expenditures.8 7
One final observation is in order. If section 304 of the Taft-
Hartley Act is found to be constitutional, administratively feasible,
and effective in achieving its purpose, its ultimate and logical
- conclusion may well be the establishment of governmental controls
over a wide range of group political activities. Such activities have
become an important aspect of American political life. Beyond
governmental prohibition of political campaign contributions and
expenditures lies governmental intervention in many other phases
of labor union activity on the political front. If, to keep elections
pure, to prevent undue influence on governmental officials, and to
protect minority elements in a labor union, laws restricting the
86. The case, of Egan v. United States, 137 F. (2d) 369 (C.C.A. Sth
1943), indicates one method of evasion, the payment of bonuses or the "pad-
ding" of expense accounts of corporate officers with the expectation that these
funds are to be contributed by them to parties or candidates. In that in-
stance corporate funds had been transferred by various subterfuges into
the possession of officers of the corporation, who used them to influence
the election of members of the Missouri Legislature deemed friendly to
the corporation's interests.
87. Cf. Louise Overacker, Presidential Campaign Funds (1946), 47ff. and p. 70; Lederle, "Political Committee Expenditures and the Hatch
Act," 44 Mich. L. Rev. 294 (1945).
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use of the group's funds in connection with public elections are
required, it is not difficult to see that similar restraints may come
to be regarded as necessary also upon the use of such funds for
maintaining lobbyists at national and state capitals, or for main-
taining central research and informational services. Group activities
of these kinds have political connotations and effects and involve
the expenditure of common funds no less than the making of cam-
paign contributions and expenditures.
Moreover, if restraints of this character are appropriate for
labor unions, they may easily come to be regarded as necessary and
appropriate for other groups and associations which espouse and
seek to achieve objectives in the realm of public policy. The halter
devised for labor unions may be found to fit just as well the Na-
tional Grange, the American Legion, the American Medical Asso-
ciation, or any of the many other organizations which now play
an active and important role in elections and in the functioning
of the legislative and administrative branches of government.88
Either there will be a retreat in the near future from the policy
incorporated in this section of the Taft-Hartley Act, through judi-
'cial invalidation of it in whole or in part or by Congressional re-
vision of its terms after more mature deliberation, or we shall be
under a compulsion to move forward, sooner or later, to an exten-
sion of the policy of restriction into new areas of group political
activity.
88. During' discussion of this section of the Taft-Hartley Bill in the
Senate, Senator Taft observed in reply to a question on this point that "if
any abuses arise with respect to other organizations [than labor unions and
corporations] we can extend the provisions of the law to other groups." 93
Cong. Rec. 6441 (1947).
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